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Many probability measures in the multiverse depend exponentially on some observable parameters,
giving rise to potential problems such as youngness bias, Q-catastrophe etc. In this paper we explore
a possibility that the exponential runaway dependence should be viewed not as a problem, but as a
feature that may help us to fix all parameters in the landscape, including the value of the cosmological
constant, without using anthropic considerations.
I. INTRODUCTION
Finding the distribution of observables in the multi-
verse is one of the most important unresolved problems
in modern cosmology, see e.g. [1–13]. Continuous work
in this area is stimulated by the possibility to merge the
theory of eternal inflation and string theory in the con-
text of the string landscape scenario [14–20]. The new
cosmological paradigm may help us to solve the cosmo-
logical constant problem. More than twenty years ago
Weinberg [21] (see also [22–25]) used the anthropic prin-
ciple to predict the smallness of the cosmological constant
with very mild assumptions about the underlying proba-
bility measure. So far this is the only known solution to
the cosmological constant problem which we shall refer
to as the anthropic solution. In this article we will look
for a non-anthropic solution to the problem.
To proceed we will make two assumptions:
1) The fundamental theory (e.g. string theory) possess
only a finite number N of vacuum solutions, landscape of
vacua, with probability distribution of observable param-
eters among vacua described by a normalizable function
P (Λ,minflaton, ...).
2) The correct cosmological measure can be de-
scribed by a positive definite weighting function
w(Λ,minflaton, ...) with an exponential dependence in at
least one but possibly many observable parameters.
The second assumption is quite generic for many prob-
ability measures which are exponentially sensitive to the
choice of parameters [26]. Such measures are often dis-
carded as potentially pathological. In this paper we will
take an opposite view, assume that the “multiverse pres-
sure” on the choice of the parameters is exponentially
strong, and study consequences of this assumption.
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II. RUNAWAY OBSERVABLES
Let vector x = (x, y, z...) denote a random observation
in the landscape with N vacua. Each component of the
vector might represent either separate observables (e.g.
x = Λ) or more generally combinations of different ob-
servables (e.g. x = m3/2Λ−3/4). The main idea of our
paper is very simple: If we consider a probability measure
w(x) that leads to exponentially strong runaway regimes
(e.g. Q-catastrophe [26]), then the “multiverse pressure”
related to w(x) may be so powerful that it will unambigu-
ously single out one particular vacuum out of the incred-
ibly large number of other vacua in the landscape. This
will simultaneously fix all physical parameters, including
the cosmological constant, masses, coupling constants,
etc.
We could find the properties of the best vacuum if we
would know properties of each vacuum in the landscape,
and the corresponding values of w(x):
〈x〉 =
∑
i=1...N xiw(xi)∑
i=1...N w(xi)
. (1)
However, for very large N one might at best hope to de-
rive the probability distribution P (x) of the parameters
among different vacua. Thus our main task as cosmolo-
gists is to estimate 〈x〉 from the two functions P (x) and
w(x) and an integer N . To do so, we must first generate
a "random landscape" of N vacua according to P (x) dis-
tribution and then populate it with observers according
to w(x). Using Eq. (1) we obtain
〈x〉 =
∫
dx1P (x1)...
∫
dxNP (xN )
∑
i=1...N xiw(xi)∑
i=1...N w(xi)
.
(2)
Alternatively one might argue that in the limit when ob-
servables can vary continuously
〈x〉 =
∫
dxw(x)P (x)x∫
dxw(x)P (x)
. (3)
Although Eqs. (2) and (3) could give similar results,
the predictions would differ for w(x) with an exponential
pressure in at least one variable.
2As was already stated in the introduction, we assume
that the measure-dependent function w(x) is exponen-
tially divergent at some isolated points x = x˜ where
P (x˜) > 0. Without loss of generality we can always
shift the divergent point to the origin x˜ = (0, 0, ...) and
choose the observable parameters such that the weighting
function is factorizable near the origin:
w(x = (x, y, z...)) ∝ eC1x +C2y +C3z +... (4)
where C1 ≥ C2 ≥ C3... and all of the sub-exponential
terms were suppressed. Since the values of the coefficients
would generically differ (i.e. C1 6= C2 6= C3...) the Eq.
(2) can be greatly simplified. In the limit of infiniteN one
and only one observational parameter x is obtained from
the runaway behavior of the weighting function 〈x〉 = 0
and all other parameters are uniquely determined by only
the probability distribution function P (x). For example,
〈y〉 =
∫
dydz...P (〈x〉 = 0, y, z, ...) y∫
dydz...P (〈x〉 = 0, y, z, ...) . (5)
What if N is a large, but finite number ∼ 10500 or 10120?
Clearly for a sufficiently large N the Eq. (5) would
still hold approximately with one important modifica-
tion. The expected value of x would not be exactly zero,
but would be slightly shifted. The amount of the shift
depends on the probability distribution P (x) of the run-
away component and on the number of vacua N , but not
on the exact shape of w(x).
Now we are ready to tackle the cosmological constant
problem. The above analysis suggests that there has to
be one and only one observable parameter whose value
differs by many orders of magnitude from all other ob-
servables. Among all of the fundamental constants mea-
sured so far, the cosmological constant is perhaps the
best candidate to play the role of a runaway observable.
Its value in dimensionless units is smaller than any other
fundamental constant by more than 100 orders in mag-
nitude. This suggests that the weighting function must
depend exponentially on the cosmological constant with
x ≡ f(Λ):
w(Λ) ∝ e
C1
f(Λ) , (6)
where f(Λ) is a faster than logarithmic function of at
least Λ, but possibly few other parameters. As we will see
from some examples below, this divergent behavior may
be strong enough to single out one particular vacuum
state in the landscape. If we can clearly identify this
state, we can unambiguously find all other parameters.
However, if our knowledge of the landscape is not good
enough, we can still estimate other parameters using the
probability distribution P (x) but not w(x).
III. EXAMPLES
A. Hawking distribution
As a toy model illustrating this possibility, let us con-
sider the landscape described by a single parameter, the
cosmological constant Λ. Let us assume, as suggested by
Hawking long time ago [27], that the cosmological con-
stant is positive and the probability distribution of the
cosmological constant in the landscape is given by
w(Λ) ∼ eS(Λ) = exp(24pi2/Λ) . (7)
Here S(Λ) ∼ 24pi2/Λ is the Euclidean action (entropy)
of dS space with the cosmological constant Λ.
A possible intuitive justification of this assumption
can be formulated as follows. dS space has entropy
S(Λ) = 24pi
2
Λ . An interpretation of dS entropy is a rather
challenging endeavour. One may try to interpret it by
saying that de Sitter space with a cosmological constant
Λ is in fact a configuration of eS(Λ) universes different
from each other at the quantum level.
Now let us make an assumption based on the Laplace’s
principle of indifference: a priori, all quantum states of
the universe are equally probable. Since the total number
of these states is given by (7), this equation represents
the probability for the universe with a given value of Λ.
We will not attempt to give here a more detailed jus-
tification of this probability distribution. In fact, we will
shortly provide alternative expressions for w(Λ). Our
main goal here is not to identify the best probability mea-
sure, but to give a set of simple examples of the mecha-
nism of the non-anthropic selection in the landscape.
In a continuous landscape, the distribution (7) leads
to a prediction Λ = 0. However, in the landscape with
N vacua the situation is quite different. Let us assume,
for simplicity, that the probability distribution P of the
different values of the cosmological constant Λi in the
landscape is relatively smooth, which means that Λ takes
N different values separated from each other by approxi-
mately 1/N in the interval from 0 to the Planck density 1.
Then one may expect that the lowest absolute value of Λ
will be about 1/N , the next one will be about 2/N , etc.
How much the lowest value will be rewarded as compared
to the next one? Assuming for simplicity that Λ1 = 1/N
and Λ2 = 2/N , one finds that
w(Λ2) ∼ w(Λ1) exp
(−12pi2N) . (8)
The relative probability to live in a vacuum with Λ≫ Λ1
will be suppressed even stronger, by exp
(−24pi2N). Even
if the distribution of values of Λi among possible vacua
is not uniform, none of these values can be rewarded by
more than the total number of vacua N , which is negli-
gible as compared to the reward ∼ exp(24pi2N) received
by the lowest vacuum in the landscape.
3This leads to two important consequences.
1) If the values of the cosmological constant are uni-
formly distributed in the landscape, then the smallest Λ,
which dominates the probability distribution, is given by
a simple estimate Λ ∼ N−1. If this is the case,1 one may
experimentally determine the total number of vacua in
the landscape by measuring Λ:
N ∼ Λ−1 ∼ 10120 , (9)
which is not unreasonable [16–20]. This value can by
greater than Λ−1 if, for example, the constant Λ is uni-
formly distributed in the interior of an M -dimensional
sphere of radius 1. In this case N ∼ Λ−M ∼ 10120M .
2) If the landscape would contain a continuous variety
of vacua, fixing the value of Λ would not tell us much
about any other parameters. Similarly, finding Λ in the
models with a power-law “multiverse pressure” is just a
first step in the chain of anthropic considerations [28, 29].
However, in the string theory landscape with the expo-
nential dependence of the measure on Λ, fixing the value
of Λ singles out one particular vacuum state, rendering
all other states irrelevant. This means that by finding the
vacuum with the smallest |Λ| we fix all other parameters;
no additional anthropic reasoning is required.
B. Baby universes reborn
Now we will consider another possibility which was
very popular in the end of the 80’s, and then died, not be-
cause it was proven wrong, but because it was extremely
difficult to prove it right: the baby universe theory [30–
33]. This theory predicted [33] that the probability to
live in a universe with a (positive) cosmological constant
Λ is given by a double exponential expression
w(Λ) ∼ eeS(Λ) = exp
(
exp
(
24pi2/Λ
))
. (10)
If the cosmological constant could take a continuous set
of values, this distribution would imply that Λ = 0. In
the landscape, this distribution would pick up the small-
est possible (positive) value of Λ. Thus, the probability
distribution would be much sharper concentrated at the
single most probable state than the distribution (7), but
the predictions in the landscape would be the same as for
the Hawking distribution. This would simultaneously fix
all other parameters, such as masses and coupling con-
stants. Everything else, including the relation between
the minimal value of Λ and the total number of vacua in
the landscape, also remains the same as in the previous
subsection.
1 The possibility that |Λ| ∼ N−1 was discussed in the past, see
e.g. [28, 29]. However, the probability measure leading to this
relation predicted that Λ must be negative [29].
C. Counting observable universes
As we already mentioned, one may try to interpret
Eq. (7) by saying that de Sitter space with a cosmo-
logical constant Λ is a configuration consisting of eS(Λ)
equally probable universes, different from each other at
the quantum level. However, one may argue that quan-
tum perturbations in an empty de Sitter space may be
important for Boltzmann brains but not for normal clas-
sical observers: In a universe which did not experience
slow roll inflation, a classical observer will see just one
classical vacuum state with a given Λ rather than eS(Λ)
different universes.
The situation is quite different in a universe which
experienced a stage of slow-roll inflation. In such a
universe, inflationary quantum fluctuations of metric
produce large-scale classical perturbations of geometry
which are responsible for CMB anisotropy and large scale
structure formation. Therefore for each vacuum state in
the landscape, a local observer living in a universe with
a given cosmological constant Λ may see a large variety
of different classical geometries produced during a stage
of a slow roll inflation [34]. What if we consider all of
these classical geometries equally probable, and use their
number as a tool for evaluation of probabilities?
In ref. [34] we found the following estimate for the
total number of classical observable universes:
w(Ne) ∼ ee
3Ne ∼ exp (λmax/λmin)3 . (11)
Here Ne is the number of e-folds of the slow-roll inflation,
λmax/λmin is the ratio of the longest wavelength of infla-
tionary perturbations to the smallest wavelength. The
origin of this result is related to the fact that the large
scale perturbations of the classical geometry are pro-
duced during each e-folding, and this process occurs inde-
pendently during each time interval O(H−1) in each do-
main of the size O(H−1). During inflation λmin ∼ H−1,
λmax ∼ H−1eNe , but both scales continue growing after
inflation. Obviously, this measure exponentially rewards
long inflation, which explains why the universe is flat.
However, a local observer can only see a small frac-
tion of these universes. Indeed, if the cosmological con-
stant is negative, the universe collapses within the time
O(|Λ|−1/2), so a local observer can only see a part of
the universe on a scale O(|Λ|−1/2). If the cosmological
constant is positive, one cannot see anything beyond the
cosmological horizon of the size |Λ|−1/2. In both cases,
λmax is limited from above by |Λ|−1/2. This limit can
be reached only if λmax >∼ |Λ|−1/2, which explains why
in this scenario inflation must be long and the universe
must be flat. The scale |Λ|−1/2 becomes visible only at
the time t ∼ |Λ|−1/2, when the density of the ordinary
matter decreases and becomes of the same order as |Λ|,
which solves the coincidence problem.
4Let us assume for a moment that λmin corresponds to
the perturbations produced at the very end of inflation.
In this case, an estimate of the maximal number of dif-
ferent locally distinguishable classical geometries made
in [34] suggests that this number is given by
w ∼ exp
(
H
3
2
I |Λ|−
3
4
)
, (12)
where HI is the Hubble constant at the end of the slow-
roll inflation.
Just as before, the number of the distinguishable ge-
ometries grows exponentially when the absolute value of
the cosmological constant decreases. In addition, this
number also grows for large HI , but in string theory the
Hubble constantHI cannot be too large, because it desta-
bilizes the vacuum. For example, the value of the inflaton
potential in the KKLT scenario typically cannot exceed
the depth of the AdS minimum prior to its uplifting, and
this depth must be much smaller than O(1) because the
AdS minimum appears due to exponentially suppressed
non-perturbative effects [35].
This may suggest that the inflationary Hubble con-
stant HI must be high, but not too high, which is consis-
tent with the present observational bound HI <∼ 3×10−5.
This would bring us one step closer to explaining the
existence of an incredibly large hierarchy of scales be-
tween the two stages of inflation, the one in the very
early universe, and the exponential expansion of the uni-
verse now, with the Hubble constantHΛ ∼ Λ1/2 ∼ 10−60.
We should note, however, that our conclusions concern-
ing HI are based on the assumption that the λmin cor-
responds to the perturbations produced at the very end
of inflation. This is not necessarily the case because the
small-scale structure of the universe may be erased by
post-inflationary dynamics. Therefore we would not put
too much faith in the HI -dependence in Eq. (12). Mean-
while the functional dependence on Λ, which puts the ex-
ponential downsizing pressure on Λ, is much more reliable
because it is related to physics on the scale of the cos-
mological horizon where the nonlinear post-inflationary
effects are inessential. Note that this measure does not
say anything about the sign of Λ: The vacuum with the
smallest |Λ| should win.
The example discussed above (see also [28]) teaches us
an interesting lesson. For a general choice of the measure
in the exponential runaway scenario, the most probable
vacuum state will be determined by the requirement that
a certain function of many different parameters should
take its maximal value in the landscape. Maximization of
the probability measure (12) required the existence of an
exponential hierarchy of scales separating HI and Λ
1/2.
The magnitude of this hierarchy of scales is closely related
to the value of
√
N , where N is the total number of the
vacua in the landscape. Similarly, one may expect that
in a more general case the exponential runaway regime
discussed in this paper may result in hierarchical relations
between other physical parameters.
IV. THE RUNAWAY BEHAVIOR IN THE
LANDSCAPE AND ANTHROPIC
CONSIDERATIONS
The laws of physics in our part of the universe must be
compatible with our own existence, hence the anthropic
principle. However, the usefulness of this principle de-
pends on the presumed uniqueness of human life and on
the relative strength of the anthropic arguments as com-
pared to the runaway behavior of the probability distri-
bution described above.
The standard approach to the cosmological constant
problem is based on the assumption that the prior prob-
ability for the cosmological constant is uniform, and the
main constraint on the cosmological constant appears be-
cause large Λ is incompatible with human life. In this pa-
per we are making an opposite assumption. We assume
that the prior probability distribution for Λ is singular,
and the singularity is avoided only because Λ can take a
discrete set of values. We also assume that the informa-
tion processing associated with life is not that rare in the
multiverse.
Indeed, we know that our own universe contains many
different types of “observers.” What if it were inhos-
pitable to humans but quite compatible with observers
of some other type? Recent literature on the measure
problem in the multiverse contains discussions of a con-
jecture that our consciousness may be associated with
programs which may run on non-biological computers of
various nature, see e.g. [36]. It may be possible to sig-
nificantly modify the laws of physics (i.e. get rid of weak
interactions) and yet have a universe which is similar to
ours in many important respects, see e.g. [37]. In such a
universe, “we” would not be made of carbon, oxygen and
hydrogen, but our properties would be quite compatible
with the properties of our universe, which would explain
all miraculous coincidences that we are trying to explain
by anthropic considerations.
As we have shown in this paper, there are some can-
didate probability measures in the landscape that single
out one particular vacuum and render the probability of
all other vacua incredibly small, suppressed by the num-
bers of the type of e−N , where N can be as large as the
total number of vacua in the landscape. If such a universe
is totally incompatible with any kind of information pro-
cessing resembling ours, we will turn to the second best
universe in the list. In this analysis, the main attention
is paid not to the choice of observers, but to the choice
of the universe (or the vacuum state in the landscape),
in a hope that the probability of emergence of intelligent
life is not as small as 10−10
100
. Being optimists, we hope
that this is a reasonable assumption.
An investigation of the probability measure in the
multiverse is complicated and controversial, so we would
5avoid making any bets here. However, if the scenario
outlined in our paper is valid, it will give us a chance
to return to the Einstein’s dream of a final theory,
which may allow us to make sharp and unambiguous
predictions despite the abundance of choice.
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